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I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of American entrepreneurs have formed a corporation or
limited liability company ("LLC").' One of the most advantageous
aspects of these two business forms and the most widespread reason
for choosing the corporation2 is the attached privilege of limited
liability. The legislative grant of limited liability provides that no
other person3 shall be liable for the debts of the corporation or LLC.4
Therefore, shareholders of a corporation are not liable for the debts
of their corporation,5 members of a LLC are not liable for the debts
of their LLC,6 and all other natural and juridical persons, including
affiliated businesses,7 are not liable for the debts of a corporation or
LLC.' According to Professors Morris and Holmes,9 "the underlying
Copyright 2003, by LOuIsIANA LAW REVIEW
1. Bizstats.com, available at http://www.bizstats.com/numbersbizs.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2001). This is the case even though business owners have several
other choices, including the proprietorship, general partnership, limited liability
partnership (LLP), traditional limited partnership, limited partnership with a
corporate general partner, and limited liability limited partnership. See Robert W.
Hamilton, Cases and Materials on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited
Liability Companies 10-28 (2001).
2. Glenn G. Morris & Wendell H. Holmes, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise:
Business Organizations § 32.01(1999) [hereinafter "Morris & Holmes"].
3. "Person" includes both natural andjuridical persons. La. Civ. Code art. 24.
There are two kinds of persons: natural persons and juridical
persons. A natural person is a human being. A juridical person is
an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a
corporation or a partnership. The personality ofajuridical person
is distinct from that of its members.
La. Civ. Code art. 24 (emphasis added).
4. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02.
5. La. R.S. 12:93(B) (2003).
6. La. R.S. 12:1320 (2003).
7. "Affiliated businesses" are distinct businesses in which one natural or
juridical person, or a group of natural or juridical persons, owns a controlling
interest. For example, a sister company is affiliated with its sister company, and a
parent company is affiliated with its subsidiary. Cf Jonathan M. Landers, A
UnifiedApproach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42
U. Chi. L. Rev. 589, 589 (1975) (defining "affiliated corporations").
8. See In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 690 So. 2d 255,
259 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); de Montfort v. Sanctuary Private Sch., 232 So. 2d
924, 926 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) ("We know of no law prohibiting the formation
of several corporations by the same stockholders and officers . . ."); Brian T.
Leftwich, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 993, 994-95
(1975-76) (citations omitted) ("[A] corporation, as ajuridical person, has a separate
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theory for [limited liability] is that the corporation is itself considered
a juridical entity, possessing its own legal personality, separate and
distinct from that of its shareholders (or of any other person for that
matter). '10 By granting limited liability to corporations and LLCs, the
legislature encourages business development."
A jurisprudential theory created and recently expanded by
Louisiana's first circuit poses four new threats to the limited liability
of Louisiana business. The first circuit's single business enterprise
theory provides authority for first circuit courts to disregard the
separate identity of corporations and LLCs in a dangerous fashion.
Under this theory, the first circuit is eroding the protection of limited
liability in ways that would shock most business owners and seem
unbelievable to most commercial lawyers.
These novel threats to the limited liability of Louisiana businesses
should not exist because they are the result of a bad jurisprudential
theory. The first circuit's single business enterprise theory is a poor
theory for two main reasons. First, the theory has been developed
throughpoor legal methodology.'" Second, the theory promotes a bad
policy.'-
These two major problems can be resolved and the legitimate
objectives of the first circuit's single business enterprise theory can
be accomplished.14 The first circuit should take actions similar to the
North Carolina Supreme Court.'" It should slightly alter the doctrine
associated with traditional veil-piercing so that traditional veil-
piercing can be applied both vertically as well as laterally.'6
and distinct existence apart from its shareholders, officers, and related
corporations.").
9. Glenn G. Morris, Vice Chancellor and Class of 1950 Professor of Law,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; Wendell H. Holmes,
Liskow and Lewis Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University.
10. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02, at 52. See also Riggins v. Dixie
Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (La. 1991); Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So.
2d 296, 298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); La. Civ. Code art. 24. See generally Morris
& Holmes, supra note 2, §§ 7.04, 7.05. Because the LLC was created, among other
reasons, to "offer the business planner ... the limited liability of corporation law,"
it seems logical that the limited liability of a LLC, like the limited liability of a
corporation, is supported by the classification of the LLC as a distinct juridical
person. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 44.01, at 482.
11. Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296, 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964). See
infra Part IV.B.
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1985); See also discussion
infra Part IV.A. 1.b.
16. See infra Part V.A.
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Part II of this article describes the threats posed by the first
circuit's single business enterprise theory. Next, the article explains
the theory's development. The fourth section analyzes the legal
methodology and policy associated with the first circuit's theory.
Finally, Part V explains a simple resolution to the problems
associated with the theory.
II. FouR NOVEL THREATS To LIMITED LIABILITY
The single business enterprise theory of Louisiana's first circuit
discourages business development by posing four new threats to the
limited liability of Louisiana businesses. These threats exist because
of the manner in which the first circuit has applied the theory in the
past as well as the theory's potential applications. All businesses in
Louisiana should be aware of the following new threats to limited
liability.
First, the first circuit's theory seemingly requires courts to
disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC if it is
"controlled" by another entity. Specifically, the first circuit states,
"[i]f one corporation is wholly under the control of another, the fact
that it is a separate entity does not relieve the latter from liability."' 7
Most, if not all, parent companies dominate or control their subsidiary
corporations or LLCs. " Therefore, if taken literally, the court's
language means that parent companies would almost always be liable
for the debts of their subsidiaries. Similarly, many companies
dominate or control sister corporations or LLCs. Therefore, if taken
literally, the court's language also means that dominant companies
would almost always be liable for the debts of their sister
corporations or LLCs. Although this language has been recited in
other Louisiana circuits, the other circuits accompany this language
with a consideration of whether dominance by one company has
caused an inequity.' 9 If no inequity exists, the other Louisiana
17. Hamilton v. AAI Ventures, L.L.C., 768 So. 2d 298, 302 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2000); Grayson v. R.B. Ammon & Assocs., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1, 14 (La. App. I st Cir.
2000), writs denied, 782 So. 2d 1026 (La. 2001), 782 So. 2d 1027 (La. 2001);
Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249, 257 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
580 So. 2d 668 (1991).
18. Even Louisiana courts have historically understood that "almost all closely-
held small business corporations are operated as the alter ego or instrumentality of
their respective shareholders." Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02, at 54.
This characterization also applies to parent companies because parent companies
are shareholders of their subsidiary corporations and members of their subsidiary
LLCs.
19. SeeLuceyMfg. Corp. v. Oil City Iron Works, 15 La. App. 12, 131 So. 57
(La. App. 2nd Cir. 1930).
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circuits respect the separate identity of the two companies.20 How-
ever, the first circuit has seemingly applied this language literally,
without any consideration of whether dominance by one company has
caused an inequity.2' These applications indicate that the first circuit
seemingly requires courts to disregard the separate identity of a
corporation or LLC if it is "controlled" by another business.
The second new threat to limited liability of Louisiana businesses
is that the first circuit's single business enterprise theory permits
"lateral veil-piercing."23 Although vertical veil-piercing is supported
20. See id.
21. See Hamilton, 768 So. 2d298; Grayson,778 So. 2d 1. See also infra Parts
III.D, IV.A.3.
22. See id.
23. The term "veil-piercing" employs two metaphors. First, it imagines a "veil"
surrounding the corporation or LLC, isolating it from those who might otherwise
be responsible for the debts of the corporation or LLC, i.e., the shareholders,
members, or affiliated businesses. This veil is "pierced" when the separate identity
of the corporation or LLC is disregarded and another natural or juridical person is
held liable for the debts of the corporation or LLC.
The terms "later veil-piercing" and "traditional" or "vertical veil-piercing"
will be used throughout this article to distinguish between two types of veil-
piercing. "Lateral veil-piercing" refers to the situation in which the separate
identity of a corporation or LLC is disregarded to impose liability on a sister
company. The term "lateral" is used because liability of the corporation or LLC is
imposed "laterally" to its sister company.
"Vertical" or "traditional veil-piercing" refers to the situation in which the
separate identity of a corporation or LLC is disregarded to impose liability on its
shareholder(s) or member(s) (remember, a parent company is a shareholder of its
subsidiary corporation or a member of its subsidiary LLC). The term "vertical" is
used because the liability of the corporation or LLC is imposed "vertically" to the
shareholder(s) or member(s). The term "traditional" is used because vertical veil-
piercing has been well-accepted for decades by courts throughout the country.
Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.01. See also Harry G. Henn & John R.
Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 346 (1983)
[hereinafter "Henn & Alexander"]. Below are simplified diagrams to illustrate
these concepts.
Vertical / Traditional Piercing Lateral Piercing
Shareholder or Member
liability is imposed on this Shareholder or Member
natural or juridical person
Corporation or LLC Piercing Sister Company
the limited liability of liability is imposed
this entity is disregarded on this entity
Corporation or LLC
the limited liability of
this entity is disregarded
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by well-accepted doctrine, the first circuit is the only circuit in
Louisiana that allows lateral piercing.24 A few courts in Texas and
North Carolina have invoked lateral piercing; however, unlike the
first circuit, these courts require the existence of an inequity.25
Lateral veil-piercing applied by the first circuit's single business
enterprise theory, therefore, is a new threat to the limited liability of
Louisiana businesses.
The third and most alarming way in which the first circuit's single
business enterprise theory threatens limited liability is by allowing
courts to disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC
without considering whether an inequity exists. The first circuit's
single business enterprise theory is almost entirely composed of an
eighteen-factor test.26 None of the eighteen factors considers whether
an inequity exists." In fact, most of the eighteen factors are
characteristic of most closely-affiliated corporations and LLCs.2  For
nearly a decade, the first circuit applied its single business enterprise
theory only in cases involving inequitable situations.29 Recently,
however, the first circuit applied its theory in cases in which there
was no indication of an inequity.3" This new application is novel
because courts consistently consider whether inequity exists when
applying traditional veil-piercing.3" Therefore, Louisiana's first
circuit is apparently the only court in the United States that disregards
the separate identity of a corporation or LLC without considering
whether an inequity exists.32
The fourth and final new threat on limited liability is that the
theory effectively alters traditional veil-piercing by permitting vertical
veil-piercing even if there is no inequity.3 Nothing stated by the first
circuit when applying its single business enterprise theory limits the
24. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.15, at 99. See also Green v.
Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249, 257 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 580 So.
2d 668 (1991).
25. See Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1985); Paramount Petroleum
Corp. v. Taylor Rental Ctr., 712 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986), writ ref'd n.r.e.; Glenn v. Wagner, 313 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984),
writ granted, 329 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1985). Seealso infra Parts IV.A.I.b-c, IV.A.2.
26. The eighteen factors are illustrative. No one factor is dispositive, and they are
to be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances. See infra Parts III.B., HI.D.
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02.
29. Id., § 32.15.
30. See infra Parts III.D., IV.A.3.
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part III.C.
33. See Hamilton v. AAI Ventures, L.L.C., 768 So. 2d 298, 302 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2000); Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249, 257 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991); infra Part III.B.
2002]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
theory's application to a lateral piercing situation. In other words, it is
conceivable that a parent company could be held liable for the debts of
a subsidiary corporation or LLC, a shareholder could be held liable for
the debts of its corporation, and a member could be held liable for the
debts of its LLC, even if there is no fraud or inequity. This is a novel
threat because for decades courts have consistently required fraud or
inequity to pierce the veil vertically.
34
Ill. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S SINGLE BusINEss ENTERPRISE THEORY IS
UNIQUE
In order to understand why these four threats are novel, it is
important to understand how and why the first circuit's theory is
unique. An explanation of the development of the theory is now
warranted.
A. Traditional Veil-Piercing
Veil-piercing is traditionally used to overcome limited liability
through vertical piercing." In other words, veil-piercing traditionally
imposes personal liability on shareholders for the debts of their
corporation or on members for the debts of their LLC. Accordingly,
parent companies, as shareholders of their subsidiary corporations or
members of their subsidiary LLCs, have traditionally been held liable
for the debts of their subsidiary companies through traditional veil-
piercing.36 However, Louisiana courts, including the first circuit, apply
traditional veil-piercing only after carefully considering the principle
that "veil-piercing is an extraordinary remedy, to be granted only
rarely."37 Considering that the policy of providing limited liability to
shareholders is the "most commonly-recited reason for the recognition
of the separate identity of the corporation,"38 it is understandable that
courts are hesitant to use traditional veil-piercing to overcome limited
liability.
1. Underlying Policies
Because it is "the strong policy of Louisiana to favor the
recognition of the corporation's separate existence,"39 courts use
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 La. L. Rev.
271,271 (1991).
36. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
37. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02 (citations omitted).
38. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.01.
39. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02.
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traditional veil-piercing to disregard the separate identity of a
corporation or LLC only if its recognition would result in unjust or
undesirable consequences inconsistent with the purpose of
incorporation or organization.' According to the Louisiana Supreme
Court, "[t]he policies behind recognition of a separate... existence
must be balanced against the policies justifying piercing. ' The major
policy supporting the recognition of the separate existence of
corporations and LLCs is "the promot[ion of] commerce and industrial
growth by encouraging [investors] to make capital contributions to
corporations [and LLCs] without subjecting all of their personal wealth
to the risks of business."42 Further, legislatures favor limited liability
because it "encourages and promotes business, commerce,
manufacturing and industry which provides employment, creates sales
of goods and commodities and adds to the nation's economic and
financial growth, stability and prosperity."'43 In short, the recognition
of the separate identity of a corporation or LLC encourages business
development.
On the other hand, disregarding the separate identity might be
justified if the corporation or LLC has been used in a manner that
does not promote commerce and industrial growth." Therefore, veil-
piercing has traditionally occurred in situations in which the
corporation or LLC has been used in an illegal manner, in a manner
in which the corporate form is disregarded, or if it would be clearly
inequitable to recognize the separate entity.45
2. Standard Doctrine
In an attempt to standardize the balancing of underlying policies
for and against veil-piercing, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Riggins
v. Dixie Shoring Company, Inc.46 endorsed two tests to determine
whether the separate identity of a corporation or LLC should be
disregarded: the Kingsman test" and the five-factor test.48  The
Kingsman test contains two parts. The first part is commonly referred
40. "[W]hile most courts will insist on the recitation of doctrine, the results they
reach suggest that they are sensitive to policy and function as well." Morris &
Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.01. See also Henn & Alexander, supra note 23, at 346.
41. Glazer v. Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 431 So. 2d 752, 757-58
(La. 1983) (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 757.
43. Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296, 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
44. Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 757; Henn & Alexander, supra note 23, at 346.
45. Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 757-58 (citations omitted).
46. 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991).
47. Kingsman Enter., Inc. v. Bakerfield Elec. Co., Inc., 339 So. 2d 1280 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1976).
48. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02 (citations omitted).
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to as the "alter ego plus fraud" test.49 It allows veil-piercing if "the
corporation [is] the 'alter ego' 0 of the shareholder [or member] ...
where fraud or deceit has been practiced on a third party by the
shareholder [or member] acting through the corporation [or LLC]." 1
The second part of the Kingsman test is commonly referred to as the
"indistinguishability" test.f2 The "indistinguishability" test allows
veil-piercing if "the corporate entity [fails] to conduct a business on
corporate footing, thereby disregarding the corporate entity to such an
extent that the corporation ceases to be distinguishable from its
shareholders." 3 The indistinguishability test is essentially a test of
estoppel-the shareholder or member should not be able to hold his
activities out to the world as personal activities and then rely on
limited liability to escape personal liability. 4
Although tests such as the Kingsman test have been used for
decades, Justice Cardozo recognized the vagueness of such tests when
he said, "[t]he whole problem [surrounding veil-piercing] is still
enveloped in the mists of metaphor."" Therefore, most post-Riggins
decisions recite the Kingsman test in conjunction with the five-factor
test, which was also endorsed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Riggins. The five-factor test uses the following nonexclusive,
unweighted factors to determine whether to recognize the separate
identity of a corporation or LLC:
(1) commingling of personal and corporate funds;
(2) the observance of statutory formalities in the
incorporation and operation of the company;
(3) undercapitalization;
(4) whether a separate bank account has been established for
the corporation, and whether its financial records are
separately maintained; and
(5) whether regular meetings of shareholders and directors
have been held. 6
49. Id.
50. Alter ego means "such unity of ownership and interest that the separate
existence of the corporation has ceased and recognition of the separate entity might
lead to an inequitable result." Robert W. Hamilton, The Law of Corporations in a
Nutshell 101 (1996). The common definition of alter ego is "another side of
oneself; a second self." The American Heritage College Dictionary 39 (3d ed.
1993).
51. Kingsman, 339 So. 2d at 1282 (citations omitted).
52. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02.
53. Kingsman, 339 So. 2d at 1282 (citations omitted).
54. Cf Landers, supra note 7, at 622.
55. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926).
56. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02 (citations omitted).
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Because several of these five factors can be found in "almost all
closely-held small business corporations,"57 veil-piercing is not allowed
if based solely on the fact that:
the shareholder owns a majority of the stock, most of the stock,
or even all of the stock of the corporation;
(1) the corporation was minimally capitalized; or
(2) the corporation was incorporated by the shareholder for the
very purpose of avoiding personal liability."8
In addition to these three restrictions, the five-factor test must also be
applied "in light of 'the totality of the circumstances.'
5 9
Admittedly, this combined application of the Kingsman and the
five-factor tests does not lead to the most objective determinations.'
Nevertheless, both tests have been endorsed by the Louisiana Supreme
Court6 and are "sensitive to policy and functions. '62 Furthermore,
these tests are similar to tests used throughout the country.6 3 Such
widespread acceptance of similar veil-piercing doctrine suggests that,
as of today, this doctrine is the best way to standardize the balancing of
underlying policies.'
B. The First Circuit's Single Business Enterprise Theory
The single business enterprise theory was adopted by the first
circuit in Green v. Champion Insurance Company.6' That case
57. Id.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id.
60. According to Professors Glenn G. Morris and Wendell H. Holmes:
Most courts decide [veil-piercing] cases as if they were being asked
to engage in some kind of metaphysical inquiry into the true nature
of corporate separateness. They explain their veil-piercing decisions
on the basis of rules and "factors" tending "under the totality of
circumstances" to support what purports to be "primarily" a factual
fmding that a particular corporation really is, or is not, the type of
separate business organization that is contemplated by the business
corporation statute .... [W]hile most courts will insist on the
recitation of doctrine, the results they reach suggest that they are
sensitive to policy and functions as well.
Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.01.
61. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991).
62. See supra note 40.
63. See generally Henn & Alexander, supra note 21, at 344-52.
64. Although a better doctrine may be developed in the future, a discussion on
possible improvements to the current veil-piercing doctrine is beyond the scope of
this article.
65. 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668(1991).
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involved the liquidation of assets of the insolvent Champion Insurance
Company ("Champion"). The insurance liquidator had a right of full
access to the records of Champion; Champion denied access. The
defendants were Champion and nine affiliated corporations,' including
sister corporations. All of the defendants were completely or nearly
completely owned and managed by a total of twelve individuals, most
of whom were members of the same family.67 The assets of Champion
and the affiliated corporations were repeatedly commingled.68 The
corporations had mutual officers, offices, and employees.69
Furthermore, some corporations handled all of Champion's business
within certain states.7°
The first circuit correctly realized that recognizing Champion's
separate identity would have been inequitable and would have
resulted in unjust or undesirable consequences inconsistent with the
purpose of incorporation.7" Therefore, the policies justifying piercing
clearly outweighed the policies behind recognizing a separate
corporate existence.72 The facts in Champion justified an application
of traditional veil-piercing.
However, for the Champion court to hold Champion's sister
companies liable for Champion's debts, the court had to pierce
Champion's veil "laterally" to the sister companies. 73  Because
Louisiana courts had never pierced the veil laterally, the Champion
court was correct when it stated, "[s]uch a situation has not been
specifically addressed by our courts. '74 The first circuit was at a
crossroads. It had to decide whether to apply traditional veil-piercing
to a lateral piercing situation, develop a new theory for lateral
piercing, or use some other approach.
The first circuit chose the latter. It did not apply traditional veil-
piercing, nor did it develop a new theory.7" Instead, the court used
traditional veil-piercing cases to support the development of an
eighteen-factor test 76 to be used for lateral piercing. The Champion
66. See supra note 7.
67. Champion, 577 So. 2d at 252-53.
68. Id. at 253.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 252.
71. See generally Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.01; Henn supra note
23, at 346.
72. See generally Glazer, 431 So. 2d at 757-58 (citations omitted).
73. See explanation of veil-piercing supra note 23.
74. Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249, 257 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 1991).
75. See infra Part IV.A.3.
76. According to the Champion court:
The following factors have been used to support an argument
that a group of entities constitute a "single business enterprise":
[Vol. 63
COMMENT
court stated that the eighteen factors are "illustrative... not intended
as an exhaustive list of relevant factors."" Furthermore, "[n]o one
factor is dispositive of the issue of "single business enterprise." 8
Using this test, the Champion court determined that the affiliated
corporations constituted a "single business enterprise,"79 giving the
liquidator the right to assert full access over the assets of all nine
corporations as if they were the assets of Champion. s°
C. Traditional Veil-Piercing vs. the First Circuit's Single Business
Enterprise Theory
Traditional veil-piercing and the first circuit's single business
enterprise theory have great similarities and differences. Both are
1. corporations with identity or substantial identity of
ownership, that is, ownership ofsufficient stock to give
actual working control;
2. common directors or officers;
3. unified administrative control of corporations whose
business functions are similar or supplementary;
4. directors and officers of one corporation act
independently in the interest of that corporation;
5. corporation financing another corporation;
6. inadequate capitalization ("thlin incorporation");
7. corporation causing the incorporation of another
affiliated corporation;
8. corporation paying the salaries and other expenses or
losses of another corporation;
9. receiving no business other than that given to it by its
affiliated corporations;
10. corporation using the property of another corporation
as its own;
I1. noncompliance with corporate formalities;
12. common employees;
13. services rendered by the employees of one corporation
on behalf of another corporation;
14. common offices;
15. centralized accounting;
16. undocumented transfers of funds between
corporations;
17. unclear allocation of profits and losses between
corporations; and
18. excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into
separate corporations.
Champion, 577 So. 2d at 257-58.
77. Id. at 258.
78. Id.
79. Champion, 577 So. 2d at 257-58.
80. Id. at 254.
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used to disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC in
order to hold another natural or juridical person liable for the debts of
the corporation or LLC. The underlying policies justifying both
theories are the same.8'
Although traditional veil-piercing and the first circuit's single
business enterprise theory achieve the same result, they use different
means to achieve that result. Four differences are particularly
noteworthy. First, whereas Louisiana courts use traditional veil-
piercing to pierce only vertically, the first circuit uses its single
business enterprise theory to pierce laterally as well as vertically.
Second, whereas the first circuit's single business enterprise
theory uses an eighteen-factor test developed by the first circuit,
traditional veil-piercing uses a combination of tests endorsed by the
Louisiana Supreme Court and other courts throughout the nation.
The eighteen-factor test of the first circuit's single business enterprise
theory consists of eighteen illustrative factors, many of which can be
found in almost all closely-affiliated businesses.8 2 First circuit courts
can apply the eighteen factor test with great flexibility because the
eighteen factors are illustrative, no one factor is dispositive, and the
eighteen factors are to be considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances.8 3
On the other hand, the combination of tests used in traditional
veil-piercing requires courts to consider circumstances beyond those
that are regularly found in most closely-affiliated corporations or
LLCs. For example, according to the first part of the Kingsman test,
courts must consider whether fraud or deceit exists. Although the
five-factor test used in traditional veil-piercing does include factors
that are found in "almost all closely-held small business[es]," 4 the
five-factor test is not as flexible as the eighteen-factor test because it
is limited with certain restrictions.8 5
Third, before applying traditional veil-piercing, courts recite the
following language as a reminder: "veil-piercing is an extraordinary
remedy, to be granted only rarely."8 6 The first circuit does not
81. See id. at 257 (citing Talen's Landing, Inc. v. MV Venture, II, 656 F.2d
1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1981); Lucey Mfg. Corp. v. Oil City Iron Works, 131 So. 57
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1930); Brown v. Benton Creosoting Co., 147 So. 2d 89, 94 (La.
App. 2nd Cir. 1962); Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296, 298 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1964).
82. See supra note 18 and sources cited therein.
83. See infra Part IV.A.2.
84. See supra note 18 and sources cited therein.
85. See supra Part III.A.2.
86. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, §32.02 (citations omitted).
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regularly recite this reminder in single business enterprise cases."'
Because it does not recite this language, the first circuit is more likely
to disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC through its
single business enterprise theory than through traditional veil-
piercing.
Fourth, whereas traditional veil-piercing tests require the
existence of an inequity, the first circuit's single business enterprise
theory does not have a similar requirement. The existence of an
inequity is important because it indicates that unjust or undesirable
consequences inconsistent with the purpose of incorporation or
organization would result if the separate identity of the corporation or
LLC is recognized. 8 Because the Champion court did not explicitly
require the existence of an inequity, it opened the door for future
courts to disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC
through the single business enterprise theory, even if recognition of
the separate identity is consistent with the legislative purpose of
incorporation or organization.
D. Recent Developments of the First Circuit's Single Business
Enterprise Theory
In 2000, the first circuit in Grayson v. R.B. Ammon and
Associates, Inc.89 expanded its single business enterprise theory in
two ways: (1) it applied the theory in a case that did not involve the
liquidation of an insurance company, ° and (2) it applied the eighteen-
factor test at its mere face-value. The former expansion is significant
because it shows that the first circuit applies its single business
enterprise theory to any type of business, not just insurance
companies that are in a position to easily defraud consumers. The
latter expansion is particularly dangerous because first circuit courts
now have first circuit authority to apply the single business enterprise
theory without balancing "[t]he policies behind recognition of a
separate corporate existence ... against the policies justifying
piercing,"'" as instructed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In Grayson, a crane operator was injured due to the negligence of
a temporary worker employed by a corporation supplying temporary
87. See supra Part m.C.
88. See supra Part III.A.1.
89. 778 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000), writ denied, 782 So. 2d 1026 (La.
2001), writ denied 782 So. 2d 1027 (La. 2001).
90. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.15.
91. Glazer v. Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 431 So. 2d 752,758 (La.
1983) (citations omitted).
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laborers. Approximately ten years before the events in question, one
corporation supplied both clerical and labor employees. High
workers' compensation rates for the labor employees increased the
company's overall workers' compensation rate. Understanding that
these overall rates would decrease if the clerical and labor businesses
of the company were separated, the owner "encouraged his young,
college-aged nephew"' to form a second corporation to provide
temporary labor employees.
Although the corporation supplying temporary labor employees
employed the negligent temporary worker, the crane operator alleged
that both corporations were liable for the negligence of the temporary
worker. The nephew owned all of the stock in the new corporation.
Shortly after he incorporated the new business for temporary labor
employees, the nephew moved out of state; thereafter, his uncle, still
the owner of the corporation providing temporary clerical employees,
handled the daily operations for the corporation supplying temporary
labor employees. Both corporations operated under the same trade
name, shared the same office, computer system, clerical staff,
personnel recruiters, and billing system. The corporation supplying
temporary labor employees did not make any reimbursements to the
corporation supplying temporary clerical employees for these
services. Based on these facts, the first circuit affirmed the trial
court's determination that the two corporations constituted a single
business enterprise.93
All single business enterprise cases before Grayson involved the
Insurance Commissioner's attempted liquidation of insurance
companies based on his findings of improprieties. In Champion, the
insurance company denied the court-appointed liquidator access to
the company's records, and assets of Champion were repeatedly
commingled with assets of the affiliated corporations.95 In another
single business enterprise case, Guste v. Green,96 the owner misled an
employee into thinking he would get a partnership interest in the
company even though the company had so little cash that it had to
borrow $400,000 to pay salaries, and the owner "did whatever he
thought was necessary or expedient to bring money into the company
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Contra Guste v. Green, 657 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995); Brown
v. Automotive Cas. Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); Green v.
Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
95. Champion, 577 So. 2d at 253.
96. 657 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).
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regardless of whether it was a prudent investment."97 In yet another
example, Brown v. Automotive Casualty Insurance Company,9" the
corporation used "an unusual circular transfer of funds between [the]
corporations [in] a plan to misrepresent the year end capital account
by $1,000,000 for reporting purposes... without property security or
collateralization and with no documentation whatsoever." 99
Grayson, however, did not involve such inappropriate activities,
nor did it involve facts indicating that the corporation abused its
separate identity. The two businesses were separately incorporated
to decrease workers' compensation costs. There is no indication of
misrepresentation, commingling of funds, or any illegitimate business
activities. The court could have, and should have, easily discussed
such facts if they existed. Because the court did not discuss such
potentially persuasive facts, we must assume that those facts did not
exist. Professors Morris and Holmes explain what types of facts
might have justified piercing in Grayson:
The facts of Grayson ... did provide some support for the
veil-piercing that occurred, if one were to infer from those
facts some effort by the controlling shareholder/manager to
cheat tort claimants out of a reasonable level of financial
responsibility for the torts committed by his laborer
employees. Perhaps this shareholder had set up the second
corporation as an undercapitalized, under-insured shell, to
protect the assets of his first corporation not only from the
higher worker compensation costs, but also from the higher
tort exposure generated by the laborer employees, and had
saved lots of money by cutting his insurance levels to
unreasonably low levels. If that was the case, the veil-
piercing that occurred in Grayson was justified and consistent
with earlier jurisprudence. 00
"But," Professors Morris and Holmes continue, "the Grayson court
never really said that is what happened."'' Nevertheless, the first
circuit affirmed that trial court's finding of a single business
enterprise and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs of certiorari.
Grayson represents drastic developments in the first circuit's
single business enterprise theory. The liquidation of an insurance
company is no longer a prerequisite to a single business enterprise
97. Id. at 619.
98. 644 So. 2d 723 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 729-30.
100. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.15 (Supp. 2002).
101. Id.
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determination. Additionally, and more significant, it appears courts
in the first circuit are required to consider only the eighteen factors at
face value. Therefore, if an undetermined number of factors in the
eighteen-factor test are satisfied, two or more businesses can be
deemed to constitute a single business enterprise. Remember, many
of the eighteen factors can be found in almost all closely-affiliated
businesses, and the factors are "illustrative and... not intended as an
exhaustive list of relevant factors."' 2  The eighteen-factor test,
therefore, seems to give courts the authority to disregard the separate
identity of a corporation or LLC merely because the corporation is
closely related to another business.
Furthermore, first circuit courts may even be required to disregard
the separate identity of a corporation or LLC if it is controlled by
another natural or juridical person because the court in Grayson
seems to literally interpret the following statement: "If one
corporation is wholly under the control of another, the fact that it is
a separate entity does not relieve the latter from liability."'0 3 The
casual analysis used in Grayson further distinguishes the first circuit's
single business enterprise theory from traditional veil-piercing.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S SINGLE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE THEORY
Because the developments in Grayson pose great danger to the
preservation of limited liability in Louisiana, the first circuit's single
business enterprise theory should be scrutinized. The first circuit's
single business enterprise theory is plagued by two fundamental
problems. First, the court used poor legal methodology when
establishing and expanding its doctrine. Second, the theory fails to
adequately consider policy concerns.
A. Poor Legal Methodology
1. The 18-Factor Test is Based on the Misapplication of
Previous Jurisprudence
As previously stated, the first circuit's single business enterprise
theory consists almost entirely of the eighteen-factor test established
in Champion. The Champion court supported the establishment of its
102. Champion, 577 So. 2d at 258; Grayson v. R.B. Ammon & Assocs., Inc.,
778 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000), writs denied, 782 So. 2d 1026 (La. 2001),
782 So. 2d 1027 (La. 2001).
103. See cases cited supra note 17.
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test with three separate cases: Baker v. Raymond International,
Inc.,0 5 Glenn v. Wagner,'0 6 and Paramount Petroleum Corp. v.
Taylor Rental Center.'07 The first circuit asserted that the eighteen
factors "have been used to support an argument that a group of
entities constitute a 'single business enterprise."" 0' 8 Each of the
eighteen factors was imported directly from one of these three
cases." 9 However, the eighteen-factor test was founded on an
erroneous interpretation and application of these cases.
a. Baker v. Raymond International, Inc.
In Baker v. Raymond International, Inc., "' an injured maritime
worker sued his employer's parent corporation for his injuries. The
parent company owned a wholly-owned subsidiary, which in turn
owned fifty percent of the employer's stock."'
Baker was erroneously applied as authority for the eighteen-factor
test because of two reasons. First, Baker is a traditional veil-piercing
case, not a single business enterprise case. The injured employee
wanted to impose liability on a parent company, not a sister company.
Vertical piercing was allowed by traditional veil-piercing long before
the development of the single business enterprise theory."2 Because
the plaintiff tried to bypass the employer's shareholder (the wholly-
owned subsidiary) and impose liability directly on the parent
corporation, it might be argued that the plaintiff was not invoking
traditional veil-piercing. This argument, however, is not supported
by the language or reasoning of the Fifth Circuit. The court explained
104. See Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249,257-58 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 668 (1991).
105. 656 F.2d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
106. 313 S.E.2d 832, 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 329 S.E.2d 326 (N.C.
1985).
107. 712 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App. -Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), writ ref'dn.r.e.
108. Champion, 577 So. 2d at 257.
109. The first factor was transported from Baker and Glenn. Factors two, four,
five, seven, eight, nine, and ten all came from Baker. Factors three, six, eleven, and
eighteen were derived from Glenn. Factors twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen,
sixteen, and seventeen came from Paramount. Compare Champion, 577 So. 2d at
257 with Baker, 656 F.2d 173, Glenn, 313 S.E.2d 832 and Paramount, 712 S.W.2d
534.
110. 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981).
111. The remaining fifty percent of the employer's stock was owned by Saudi
Arabian princes and corporations. Id. at 181.
112. "Veil-piercing is most commonly used as a justification for imposing
personal liability on corporate shareholders for corporate debts .. ." Morris, supra
note 35, at 271.
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that the traditional veil-piercing doctrine could be applied to the case;
furthermore, it never even used the term "single business
enterprise."' 3 As further evidence that the Fifth Circuit was invoking
traditional veil-piercing, the court remanded the case because the trial
court did not adequately instruct the jury on traditional veil-
piercing." 4
The second reason the Champion court erroneously applied Baker
is that the Champion court did not explain one important reason for
which the Fifth Circuit remanded Baker. The Baker court remanded
the case, in part, because the trial court should have "explained at
least the rudiments of limited liability" to the jury.' ' An explanation
of limited liability would have helped the jury understand that courts
disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC in order to
correct inequities. 16 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit in Baker stated
that courts "exercise their equitable power" to ignore the principle of
limited liability "when 'the justice of the case' requires." 17 Even
though not explaining the necessity of inequity was sufficiently grave
to cause a remand in the Baker case, the Champion court did not
include this requirement for its single business enterprise theory.
Although the Champion court used Baker to show factors that had
"been used to support an argument that a group of entities constitute
a 'single business enterprise,""'" Baker was not even a single
business enterprise case; it was a traditional veil-piercing case.
Furthermore, the Champion court did not incorporate one of the most
important reasons for which the Fifth Circuit remanded Baker-the
trial court did not adequately consider whether an inequity exists.
These two errors by the Champion court resulted in a severe
misapplication of Baker. Baker does not support the establishment
of the first circuit's single business enterprise theory.
b. Glenn v. Wagner
The second case on which the Champion court based the
establishment of its eighteen-factor test, Glenn v. Wagner, "' involved
a motel-apartment complex. This complex was owned by B-Bom,
Inc. ("B-Bom"), but was leased and managed by B-Bom's sister
113. See Baker, 656 F.2d at 180.
114. Id. at 179-82.
115. Id. at 180.
116. Id. at 179.
117. Id. (citations omitted).
118. Champion, 577 So. 2d at 257.
119. 313 S.E.2d 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 329 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1985).
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corporation, D & S Enterprises, Inc. ("D & S"). Fifty percent of each
corporation was owned by David Wagner ("David"). David's cousin,
Smilie, owned the remaining fifty percent of D & S; he also managed
D & S. D & S was established to lease the complex from B-Bom,
and "mainly... to help [Smilie] make some additional funds."' 20
Although Smilie managed the day-to-day activities and controlled
the finances of D & S, David served as Smilie's advisor and
consultant.' 2' Further, David's law office was the corporate offices
of both B-Bom and D & S. D & S rarely, if ever, respected corporate
formalities. The informal nature of D & S was apparent when David
stated that he "'thought' that he was president and treasurer, and
therefore, that Smilie 'must be' vice-president and secretary. ' '122
According to the court, "[t]he only formal instrument executed on
behalf of D & S was the lease agreement with B-Bom. David
Wagner drafted the lease and signed it both as president of B-Born
and as president of D & S on January 1," even though D & S was not
incorporated until May 8.123 Two years after it was drafted, the lease
between D & S and B-Bom was dissolved. In a deposition, David
responded to a question concerning whether any formality was taken
to dissolve the lease: "No. [D & S] simply informed B-Born... but
that's like me informing me, but D & S essentially told B-Bom...
that it's no longer in the business of operating [the motel-apartment
complex], and B-Bom said fine."' 124
Plaintiffs were tenants of the complex owned by B-Bom, but
leased and managed by D & S. After one plaintiff fell behind in his
rent, Smilie, as an agent of D & S, instructed his personal employee
to padlock the plaintiffs' apartments, move their personal property to
a storage room, clean their apartments, and return their mail to the
post office.
The jury found D & S liable for trespass, breach of quiet
enjoyment, and conversion. 25 At the time of the verdict, however, D
& S was insolvent. 26 Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that the
separate identity of D & S should be disregarded to impose liability
on its sister corporation, B-Bom.
In Glenn, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court
because of inadequate jury instructions. Specifically, the court of
120. Id. at 836.
121. Id. at 835, 837.
122. Id. at 837.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 838 (emphasis removed).
125. Glenn, 313 S.E.2d at 832.
126. Id. at 838.
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appeals found that the trial court should not have instructed the jury
on traditional veil-piercing doctrine, primarily because traditional
veil-piercing can be applied only to pierce the veil vertically, not
laterally.' Because the North Carolina court of appeals ruled that
traditional veil-piercing was inapplicable, it found that the trial judge
should have instructed the jury on North Carolina's "single
enterprise" theory. 2 8
The Champion court, however, failed to understand the reason for
which the Glenn court of appeals decision was overturned. The North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals decision cited
by the Champion court because the North Carolina court of appeals
"erred in holding that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury
with respect to piercing the corporate veil."' 29 Stated another way, the
North Carolina Supreme Court found that traditional veil-piercing
doctrine could be applied to lateral piercing situations. The North
Carolina Supreme Court explicitly stated that "piercing the corporate
veil is broad enough to encompass both those situations where there
is direct stock ownership of a subsidiary corporation by a parent
corporation, and stock control as exercised through a mutual
shareholder."' 30 The North Carolina Supreme Court continued by
applying traditional veil-piercing to find that "the two corporations in
this case functioned as a single business enterprise."'' Although the
supreme court determined that a "single business enterprise" existed,
it made this determination by applying traditional veil-piercing
doctrine. Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly
reminded its lower courts that traditional veil-piercing, which it
applied to a so-called single business enterprise situation, "is an
equitable doctrine,"' to be applied "whenever necessary to prevent
fraud or to achieve equity."'
127. Id. at 840-44. The court of appeals found that the following language was
inapplicable to traditional veil-piercing situations: "the corporate entity may be
disregarded if the corporation is totally dominated by an individual shareholder, and
operated as his 'alter ego,' whether the sole or dominant shareholder is an
individual or another corporation." Id. at 840. Notice that this language is
strikingly similar to the following language used by Louisiana's first circuit: "If one
corporation is wholly under the control of another, the fact that it is a separate entity
does not relieve the latter from liability." Green v. Champion Ins. Co. 577 So. 2d
249, 257 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991) quoting Lucey Mfg. Corp. v. Oil City Iron
Works, 131 So. 57, 61 (La. App. 2d Cir.1930). See also supra note 17.
128. Glenn, 313 S.E.2d at 844.
129. Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326, 328 (N.C. 1985).
130. Id. at 333.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 332.
133. Id. at 330.
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The North Carolina Supreme Court case, therefore, stands for at
least two propositions. First, traditional veil-piercing can be used to
determine whether a "single business enterprise" exists. If it does, a
court can hold a company liable for the debts of its sister corporation
or LLC. The term "single business enterprise" is used as a
description of the business structure. The North Carolina Supreme
Court associated the term "single business enterprise" with lateral
piercing situations. Second, the North Carolina Supreme Court
clearly established that the separate identity of a corporation or LLC
should be disregarded only if "necessary to prevent fraud or to
achieve equity. ' 'I34
The Champion court cited the North Carolina court of appeals
decision to support the establishment of its single business enterprise
theory, stating that the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals decision "on other grounds.""' Perhaps the
Champion court determined that the Glenn decision was "reversed on
other grounds" because the North Carolina Supreme Court did not
explicitly address the "single enterprise" theory used by the North
Carolina court of appeals. In reality, however, the North Carolina
Supreme Court believed that a "single enterprise" theory is an
unnecessary and improper extension of traditional veil-piercing. The
court of appeals remanded the case for the trial court to instruct the
jury on a "single enterprise" theory because the court of appeals
determined that traditional veil-piercing doctrine is not applicable to
vertical piercing situations. The supreme court, however, reversed
the court of appeals decision because traditional veil-piercing
doctrine is applicable to vertical piercing situations. The North
Carolina Supreme Court clearly implied that a "single enterprise"
theory is an unnecessary and improper extension of traditional veil-
piercing. Clearly, the Champion court misinterpreted Glenn. Glenn
simply does not support the establishment of the first circuit's single
business enterprise theory. 136
134. Id.
135. Green v. Champion, 577 So. 2d 249, 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
136. However, even if the North Carolina court of appeals would have been
correct in ordering the trial court to instruct the jury on a "single enterprise" theory,
the Champion court still misapplied the "single enterprise" theory of North
Carolina's court of appeals for two main reasons. First, the Champion court did not
incorporate a requirement of inequity, which was crucial to the North Carolina court
of appeals's decision. Second, the Champion court misconstrued certain factors
listed in the Glenn court of appeals decision.
The Glenn court of appeals decision cited in Champion required the
existence of an inequity in order to apply its single enterprise theory; however, the
Champion court failed to incorporate that element into its single business enterprise
2002]
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theory. The North Carolina court of appeals in Glenn supported its "single
enterprise" theory with a North Carolina Supreme Court case, Fountain v. West
Lumber Co., 76 S.E. 533 (N.C. 1912). Glenn, 313 S.E.2d at 844 (citations
omitted). Fountain, the first case to recognize the "single enterprise" theory in
North Carolina, involved a group of businesses that used "the device of separate
corporations . . . in order to evade responsibility." Id. (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Glenn court of appeals allowed the imposition of liability through
its "single enterprise" theory only if"it would be unjust to recognize, as a separate
entity, one of the individual corporat[ions]." Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the court of appeals refused to apply certain language unless the
control of the dominant corporation caused an inequity. Specifically, the court
stated that the language applies "where the corporation to be 'disregarded' has been
properly incorporated but is thereafter ignored as a separate entity by its owners to
the detriment of the party injured." Glenn, 313 S.E.2d 841 (second emphasis
added). Therefore, although the North Carolina court of appeals endorsed a "single
business enterprise" theory (remember, the North Carolina Supreme Court later
reversed this endorsement), its theory, unlike Louisiana's first circuit's theory,
requires the existence of an inequity.
Understanding that there must be an inequity, the North Carolina court of
appeals justified its implication that B-Born and D & S constituted a single
enterprise with a finding that the entity was inadequately capitalized. Id. at 848.
Supported by North Carolina Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court of appeals
considered the inadequate capitalization of an incorporated enterprise, sometimes
called "thin incorporation," to be an "abuse of the privilege of... limited liability"
because it poses a great risk of insolvency. Id. at 847 (citations omitted). Further,
inadequate capitalization is an "attempt to do business without proper safeguards
for creditors." Id. at 848 (emphasis omitted). A corporation can be inadequately
capitalized if it "leas[es] ... all or most of the property which it needs to operate."
Id. at 847 (citations omitted). The North Carolina court of appeals found that D&S
was inadequately capitalized because "its primary asset [was] the lease of a [motel-
apartment complex] which [was] meant to produce income almost exclusively for
the owner-corporation, [B-Bom,] and very little else." Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
In short, the Glenn court of appeals applied its requirement of inequity.
In addition to not requiring inequity, the Champion court misconstrued
factors used by the North Carolina court of appeals in Glenn. The court of appeals
in Glenn based its decision on a distinction between traditional veil-piercing and a
"single enterprise" theory. Specifically, the court of appeals found that traditional
veil-piercing could not be applied laterally; therefore, according to the North
Carolina court of appeals, the trial court should have instructed the jury on a "single
enterprise" theory, not traditional veil-piercing. In a preface to its discussion
concerning why traditional veil-piercing doctrine could not be applied laterally, the
court of appeals in Glenn listed four factors used in traditional veil-piercing:
1. inadequate capitalization ("thin incorporation");
2. noncompliance with corporate formalities;
3. complete domination and control of the corporation so that it
has no independent identity;
4. excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into separate
corporations.
Id. at 839 (citations omitted).
Even though the court of appeals in Glenn associated these factors with
traditional veil-piercing, which it went to great pains to distinguish from a single
COMMENT
c. Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Taylor Rental Center
The third case on which the first circuit based the establishment
of its eighteen-factor test was Paramount Petroleum Corporation v.
Taylor Rental Center.' The first circuit should not have used
Paramount as authority for its single business enterprise thoery for
two reasons. First, Paramount was improperly decided-it should
not have been a single business enterprise case. Second the
Paramount court, like the Champion court, misapplied prior
jurisprudence.
Paramount involved a determination of liability for a rental
contract. Plaintiff, Taylor Rental Center, was in the business of
renting equipment to be used on seagoing vessels. At least two
requests were made to rent equipment for a vessel named the
"Courtney D." Due to certain ambiguities associated with one of
these requests, the court had to determine whether one or two
businesses were liable for the contract.
One request came from Captain Weld. Because Weld gave
Plaintiff a business card with the name "Paramount Steamship
Company, Ltd." ("Steamship"), it was clear that Weld was acting as
Steamship's agent. Therefore, Steamship was undisputably liable for
the contract.
business enterprise theory, the Champion court asserted that the Glenn court of
appeals used these factors "to support an argument that a group of entities constitute
a 'single business enterprise."' Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So. 2d 249,257 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991). The most striking effect of this mistake by the Champion court
is that it caused the first circuit to contradict itself. On one hand, the Champion court
supported the establishment of its single business enterprise theory by relying on the
distinction the Glenn court of appeals made between traditional veil-piercing and a
single business enterprise theory. Without this distinction, there would be no reason
to establish a separate single business enterprise theory (remember, the North Carolina
Supreme Court later overruled this distinction). On the other hand, however, the
Champion court disregarded this distinction by incorporating factors associated with
traditional veil-piercing into the first circuit's eighteen-factor test used for its single
business enterprise theory. In other words, the Champion court simultaneously
acknowledged and disregarded the reasoning in Glenn.
These two major errors by the Champion court are further proof that the first
circuit's single business enterprise theory has been problematic from its inception.
The first circuit made grave mistakes in its interpretation and application of Glenn.
For this reason, the first circuit's single business enterprise theory was erroneously
established and should not be applied in the future.
137. 712 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986), writ ref'd n.r.e.
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Another request came from Captain Jackson. Although it was
clear that Jackson was renting as the agent of a business, he did not
indicate the name of his business, the principal of the contract.
Jackson did, however, give the rental company a phone number.
When the rental company called the phone number given by
Jackson, someone answered, "Paramount," and verified that Jackson
was employed by Paramount and was authorized to rent the
equipment. Nevertheless, Plaintiff was instructed to send the
invoices, which listed only Steamship as a debtor, to Paramount's
post office box.
The identity of the principal, however, remained uncertain
because both Steamship and its sister corporation, Paramount
Petroleum Corporation ("Petroleum"), used Paramount as their trade
name. The court also considered the following facts:
The same shareholder owned all of the stock in both
companies. The two companies operated from the same
Houston office. They used the same telephone number and
the same post office box. Both companies paid funds to
Captain Jackson for repair work on the Courtney D. The
employees of both companies referred to both companies as
"Paramount." Petroleum transferred funds, with no ledger
entries, to a checking account over which an employee of
Steamship was signatory. The president of Steamship
testified that assets of Petroleum were seized when the
Courtney D was seized. All accounting for the two
companies was performed at the Houston office by an
employee paid by Petroleum. Finally, Petroleum failed to
produce, in response to discovery requests, any corporate
records of either corporation ... [T]he corporations shared
the goal of restoring the Courtney D. Petroleum funded the
bank account from which the restoration expenditures were
paid. Petroleum's employees performed the accounting for
the restoration. Steamship's employees performed the actual
reconditioning work and hired subcontractors.'38
The rental company alleged that Petroleum, in addition to
Steamship, was liable for the rental contract. The fourteenth district
court of appeals in Texas affirmed the trial court's decision that
Petroleum was liable, asserting that a single business enterprise
theory could justify the trial court's judgment. 39
138. Id. at 536-37.
139. The court stated:
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However, Paramount was decided improperly-it should not
have been a single business enterprise case. In agency law, principals
are liable for the acts of their agents.' 40 Because it was obvious that
Jackson was acting as the agent of a business, his principal would be
liable. The correct issue concerned the identity of Jackson's
principal: was it Steamship or Petroleum? Although this issue may
have been difficult to determine, the Paramount court should not
have avoided a difficult determination of agency law by creating a
new, unfounded theory.' 4' Paramount should have been decided as
a partial disclosure case, 142 not a single business enterprise case.
The second reason for which Paramount is poor authority for the
first circuit's single business enterprise theory is that the Paramount
court justified the creation of its single business enterprise theory with
the misapplication of two Texas cases. One of these two cases,
Allright Texas, Inc. v. Simons, 43 uses the other case, Murphy
Brothers Chevrolet Company, Inc. v. East Oakland Auto Auction,144
as the sole justification for Allright's single business enterprise
determination. Therefore, Murphy is the basis for both Allright and
Paramount. Murphy, however, does not justify the establishment of
the single business enterprise theory.
Although the Paramount court asserted that Murphy "put forward
... the 'single business enterprise' theory,"' 45 Murphy was not a
single business enterprise case-it did not even consider whether the
separate identity of a corporation or LLC should be recognized. Even
This case was tried to the court without a jury, and no findings of
fact or conclusions of law were filed or requested. Thus, the trial
court's judgment implies all necessary fact findings in support of
the judgment. Furthermore, the trial court's judgment should be
affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal theory .... We find the
present record contains evidence sufficient to justify an implied
finding that Petroleum and Steamship operated as a single business
enterprise.
Id. at 536 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
140. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 21.04, at 539. Also, "the agent is
normally liable." Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 33.06, at 114.
141. This was a difficult question because Jackson did not specify for which
business he was acting as an agent. Further, both Steamship and Petroleum used the
same trade name. Paramount, 712 S.W.2d 534.
142. Partial disclosure occurs when "the agent has disclosed his agency status,
and usually some information concerning the identity of his principal, but without
disclosing enough information to allow the third party to identify the principal with
adequate precision." Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 33.06.
143. 501 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lstDist.] 1973), writ refd
n.r.e.
144. 437 S.W.2d 272, 275-76 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1969), writ refd n.r.e.
145. Paramount, 712 S.W.2d at 536.
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though the appellant in Murphy apparently argued that its separate
identity should prevent it from being held liable, the court found the
issue to be inapplicable because there was "no fact issue to
substantiate the.., issue or argument."' 4 6 Rather, the Murphy court
held a corporation liable because it bound itself through its own
actions, even though it was an agent for an affiliated corporation.'47
Recognizing that "when an agent makes, endorses or accepts a
negotiable instrument in his own name, he is personally liable
thereon,"' 48 the Murphy court affirmed that the appellant was liable
because it bound itself through its own activities. Murphy, therefore,
was misconstrued by Allright and Paramount. This means that the
single business enterprise theory of Texas, upon which the first circuit
relies, was improperly established.
The Paramount case, therefore, considered the wrong issue;
consequently, it established a new theory of law-Texas's single
business enterprise theory-when it should have relied on well-
accepted agency law. Even if it did consider the right issue, however,
the Paramount court, like the Champion court, based the
establishment of its theory on the misapplication of previous cases.
2. The First Circuit's Single Business Enterprise Theory vs.
Texas's Single Business Enterprise Theory
Even though Texas's single business enterprise theory was
erroneously established, it continues to be applied; therefore, it should
be compared and contrasted with the first circuit's theory. Texas and
Louisiana's first circuit apply their respective theories under
significantly different circumstances. Certain language used by Texas
courts forces them to be more careful before disregarding the separate
identity of a corporation or LLC. Because the first circuit does not
employ similar language, its theory is applied in a much more
dangerous fashion than the Texas theory.14
Texas courts regularly preface an application of their single
business enterprise theory with a statement explaining that the theory
is an equitable doctrine, analogous to partnership principles:'
146. Murphy, 437 S.W.2d at 275.
147. Under agency law, in addition to the principal, "the agent is normally
liable." Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 33.06, at 114.
148. Murphy, 437 S.W.2d at 276.
149. See Grayson v. RB. Ammon & Assocs., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2000), writs denied, 782 So. 2d 1026 (La. 2001), 782 So. 2d 1027 (La. 2001).
150. Alum. Chemicals (Bol.), Inc. v. Bechtel Corp., 28 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Tex.




"When two corporations are not operated as separate entities but
instead integrate their resources to achieve a common business
purpose, it may be equitable, under exceptional circumstances, to
hold each constituent corporation liable for the debts and liabilities
incurred in the common enterprise.""' Although the "exceptional
circumstances" language is also commonly found in traditional veil-
piercing cases in Louisiana," it is not regularly found in first circuit
single business enterprise cases. Because most of the factors in
Texas's eight-factor test'53 and the first circuit's eighteen-factor test
are common to many closely-affiliated businesses, they are rarely
indicative of a situation in which a corporation or LLC has abused its
separate identity. The "exceptional circumstances" language found
in the Texas theory causes Texas courts to be more cautious, thereby
precluding courts from considering their eight-factor test at face
value. On the other hand, because the first circuit's theory is not
accompanied with similarly restrictive language, first circuit courts do
apply their eighteen-factor test at its mere face value.'54
Additionally, Texas courts regularly recite phrases such as "it is
a doctrine founded in equity,"' 55 or "the.., theory relies on equity."1
56
The first circuit does not consider equity. In fact, the Grayson court
disregarded the separate identity of affiliated businesses without any
facts indicative of inequity."5 By applying the theory only to achieve
equity, Texas courts are actually more in line with the Louisiana
Supreme Court than Louisiana's first circuit. Texas courts apply their
single business enterprise theory in accordance with the principle set
forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Glazer v. Commission on
151. N. Am. Van Lines, 50 S.W.3d at 120 (citing Paramount Petroleum Corp. v.
Taylor Rental Ctr., 712 S.W.2d 534, 536-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1986); Old Republics Ins. Co. v. Ex-Im Servs. Corp., 920 S.W.2d 393, 395-96
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996).
152. Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02 (citations omitted).
153. Texas's single business enterprise theory consists of eight non-exclusive
factors. These include: (1) common employees; (2) common offices; (3)
centralized accounting; (4) payment of wages by one corporation to another
corporation's employees; (5) common business name; (6) services rendered by the
employees of one corporation on behalf of another corporation; (7) undocumented
transfers of funds between corporations; and (8) unclear allocation of profits and
losses between corporations. Paramount, 712 S.W.2d at 536 (citations omitted).
See also N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Emmons, 50 S.W.3d 103, 121 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2001).
154. See Grayson, 778 So. 2d at 1.
155. N. Am. Van Lines, 50 S.W.3d at 120.
156. Id. at 119.
157. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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Ethicsfor Public Employees:5 ' in order to disregard the separate identity
of a corporation or LLC, the policies supporting recognition must be
outweighed by policies justifying piercing.
Finally, whereas the Texas theory uses eight factors, the first circuit's
theory uses eighteen factors. " Although both sets of factors are
illustrative and no factor is dispositive, 6' the fact that Texas courts recite
less than half of the factors recited by the first circuit indicates that the
Texas theory is applied more narrowly. Furthermore, the Texas factors
are subject to the guiding principles explained in the previous three
paragraphs. Although the use of eight factors in Texas gives Texas
courts broad parameters, the use of eighteen factors without any guiding
principles or limitations by the first circuit removes virtually all limits in
the test's application-a first circuit court desiring a certain outcome can
justify nearly any finding through an application of the eighteen-factor
test. Because the first circuit's theory is so broad, it serves as a blank
check to the courts, which is unlike the theory in Texas.
3. The First Circuit's Fundamental Misunderstanding of the
Relationship Between its Single Business Enterprise Theory and
Traditional Veil-Piercing
The legal methodology employed by the first circuit in its single
business enterprise theory manifests a fundamental misunderstanding of
the relationship between its single business enterprise theory and
traditional veil-piercing. The first circuit has stated that the single
business enterprise theory and veil-piercing are two separate theories' 62
When discussing the burden of proof to be applied to the single business
enterprise theory, the first circuit ruled that "[b]ecause the separateness
of the corporate entity is disregarded in both the 'single business
enterprise' theory and the 'piercing the corporate veil' theory... the two
theories should both be subjected to the same burden of proof."'63
However, the first circuit does not always treat traditional veil-
piercing and the single business enterprise theory as two distinct
158. 431 So. 2d 752 (La. 1983).
159. Id. at 757-58.
160. Compare supra note 153 with supra note 76.
161. Id.
162. Grayson v. R.B. Ammon & Assocs., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1, 17-18 (La. App. 1 st
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Texas courts have also separated the two theories:
"'Alter ego' and 'single business enterprise' are not synonymous; they are separate
and distinct equitable theories, although similar in purpose." N. Am. Van Lines,
Inc. v. Emmons, 50 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001).
163. Grayson, 778 So. 2d at 14 (emphasis added).
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theories. In Hamilton v. AAI Ventures, L.L.C.,'" the plaintiff sued
the defendant for breach of contract. A corporation owned a
majority interest in the defendant, a LLC. Although the defendant,
not the parent corporation, entered into an agreement with the
plaintiff, the first circuit held that the defendant and its member, the
parent corporation, were solidarily liable for breach of contract.
Throughout its analysis, the first circuit casually discussed a
variety of theories as if they are without distinction. First, the court
stated that there are "only two exceptional circumstances,"'65 under
which Louisiana courts pierce the corporate veil: "where the
shareholders acting through the corporation commit fraud or deceit
on a third party and where the shareholders have failed to conduct
the business on a corporate footing, disregarding the corporate
entity to such extent that they and it become indistinguishable."'
' 66
Along with this traditional veil-piercing language, the court then
recited the five-factor test used in traditional veil piercing cases. 1
67
Suddenly, however, the court recited doctrine from Champion, the
fountainhead of all single business enterprise cases, to justify its
disregard of the corporation's separate identity.6 6 Furthermore, the
court combined traditional veil-piercing's totality of the
circumstances rule with a significant portion of Champion's
eighteen-factor test.6 9
By using traditional veil-piercing doctrine interchangeably with
the first circuit's single business enterprise theory, a court can apply
the two theories as it sees fit, depending on the facts of the case and
the desired outcome. In Hamilton, for example, the court used the
eighteen-factor test of the single business enterprise theory to justify
traditional veil-piercing. 70 Through this method, the court executed
traditional veil-piercing without analyzing whether an inequity
exists. This approach allows the court to use the blank check
associated with the single business enterprise theory in traditional
veil-piercing situations. If Hamilton is not overruled, it could
disrupt decades of jurisprudence that have carefully balanced
underlying policies.
The combination of doctrines in Hamilton was unnecessary.
Perhaps the court thought it needed to justify traditional veil-
164. 768 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
165. Id. at 302.
166. Id.
167. Id. See also supra Part IM.A.2.
168. Hamilton, 768 So. 2d at 302.




piercing in Hamilton because the member of the LLC was a
corporation and not an individual. However, it is well-accepted that
traditional veil-piercing can be used to impose liability on members
or shareholders, regardless of whether the member or shareholder
is a natural or juridical person. 7' Therefore, instead of mixing two
separate doctrines, the court should have simply applied traditional
veil-piercing. Perhaps this confusion of the first circuit would not
exist had it not misapplied prior jurisprudence in Champion.
B. Poor Policy
In addition to being founded upon and executed with poor legal
methodology, the first circuit's single business enterprise theory also
promotes a poor policy for Louisiana. In order to encourage business
development beneficial to the state's economy,' the legislature
grants limited liability under which no other entity, not even an
affiliated business, is liable for the debts of a corporation or LLC.'73
Because the theory removes the assurance of limited liability, it
contravenes the legislature's policy to encourage business
development.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the legislative intent of
limited liability when it stated, "Because of the beneficial role of the
corporate concept, the limited liability.., should be disregarded only
in exceptional circumstances."'174 Because of the guarantee of limited
liability, businesses are able to form multiple corporations or LLCs
to help separate functions for administrative and financial ease and
economies, to reduce risk through diversification, to comply with
various legal requirements, to minimize liability or to insulate certain
assets from liability for other activities, or to expand internally into
171. "A parent corporation may be held liable for the debts of a subsidiary if the
parent fails to observe the formalities of separate incorporation, including adequate
capitalization of the subsidiary." Baker v. Raymond Int'l., Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 179
(5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); see also Morris & Holmes, supra note 2, §
32.02, at 52.
172. Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296, 299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964). See
also Brian T. Leftwich, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 22 Loy. L. Rev.
993, 995 (1975-76).
173. See supra Part III.A.
174. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (La. 1991)
(citing Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964)) (emphasis
added). Note that the case from which the supreme court derived this statement was
actually a first circuit case.
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an unrelated line of business.'75 According to Professor Landers, 17 6
this ability to form multiple businesses, each protected by limited
liability, encourages business development in the following ways:
[F]irst, [it] encourage[s] an existing business to expand into
a new field by limiting its risk in doing so; second, [it]
permit[s] the insulation of parts of a business enterprise from
the risks of other parts in circumstances where the separate
parts might exist as separate businesses; and third, it can]
satisfy various legal or administrative requirements."'
The existence of these options helps to stimulate the economy
because businesses are protected if they take risks.
Although the legislature obviously favors the protection of limited
liability, it does not intend for businesses to create enterprises in order
to avoid liability by doing things such as putting "all the assets... in
one company and all the liabilities ... in another." '178 Therefore,
courts must delicately balance competing interests-they must honor
the legislative intent of limited liability, while preventing abuse of the
corporate entity.
The first circuit's single business enterprise theory does not
adequately balance policy concerns because it uses a poor judicial
standard. Unlike the Texas theory, the first circuit's theory does not
have a preface guiding courts to apply the theory only when "it may
be equitable, under exceptional circumstances." This statement by
Texas courts reminds them to pause and consider outside influences,
including legislative policy. The lack of incentive to consider
legislative policy in the first circuit is exacerbated by the fact that the
theory consists almost entirely of a test of eighteen illustrative, non-
dispositive factors to be considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances. This "test" basically gives courts the authority to
disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC under almost
any situation.8 0
Furthermore, policy concerns are not reflected in the substance of
the eighteen factors. Most of the eighteen factors can be found in
most closely-affiliated corporations or LLCs. 8' For example, the
first circuit in Grayson alleged only legitimate business activities, yet
175. Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43
U. Chi. L. Rev. 499 (1976); Landers, supra note 7, at 589.
176. Jonathon M. Landers, Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
177. Landers, supra note 7, at 621.
178. Landers, supra note 7, at 621.
179. See supra Part IV.A.2.
180. See supra Part IV.A.2.
181. See supra note 18.
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liability was imposed because some of these legitimate activities
happened to fall within some of the eighteen factors.'82 Instead of
disregarding limited liability "only in exceptional circumstances," '83
the eighteen-factor test allows courts to disregard limited liability
under ordinary business circumstances.
Under the first circuit's theory, business owners have no
assurance that their limited liability will be recognized. By taking
away the dependability of limited liability, the first circuit inhibits the
legislative goal of encouraging business development. Corporations
and LLCs must conduct their business outside of Louisiana to ensure
the recognition of their limited liability. Therefore, the first circuit's
single business enterprise theory discourages business development,
which is a bad policy for Louisiana.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
As illustrated in Champion, some corporations abuse the privilege
of limited liability. One way in which this can occur is if an
enterprise tries to avoid liability by putting "all the assets... in one
company and all the liabilities... in another.""' Such activities are
inconsistent with the legislative intent of limited liability; therefore,
they should not be tolerated. The single business enterprise theory
attempts to resolve this problem, but the theory is so broad that a
court can disregard the separate identity of a corporation or LLC even
if that business has not abused its limited liability. Fortunately, there
is a way to both prevent abuses of limited liability and continue
encouraging business development. Louisiana courts should take an
approach similar to North Carolina's Supreme Court-they should
slightly alter traditional veil-piercing so that it can be applied laterally
as well as vertically.
A. Slight Alteration to Traditional Veil-Piercing Doctrine
Although there are two main differences between traditional veil-
piercing and the single business enterprise theory, these differences
actually support the application of traditional veil-piercing to single
business enterprise situations. First, whereas traditional veil-piercing
imposes liability vertically, the single business enterprise theory
imposes liability laterally. However, nothing would prevent
182. See discussion supra Part III.D.
183. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (La. 1991)
(citing Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).).
184. Landers, supra note 7, at 621.
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traditional veil-piercing from being applied laterally. While
traditional veil-piercing is already used to correct abuse between
parent and subsidiary corporations or LLCs, a lateral application of
traditional veil-piercing could be used to correct abuse by sister
companies. Such an application would allow courts to impose
liability on a sister company for the debts of a sister corporation or
LLC, but would require courts to consider the principles associated
with traditional veil-piercing. The veil would be pierced "only under
exceptional circumstances" ' after balancing underlying policy
concerns.
The second difference between the two theories is that they apply
different tests. In traditional veil-piercing cases, courts usually apply
the Kingsman and five-factor tests together.8 6 The Kingsman test has
two parts: the alter ego plus fraud test and the indistinguishability test.
Courts also consider a five-factor test, which is limited by three
restrictions, but is considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances. '87 The single business enterprise theory, on the other
hand, consists of only an eighteen-factor test. Whereas the veil-
piercing tests adequately consider underlying policy concerns, the
eighteen-factor test does not.
Therefore, the Kingsman and five-factor tests should be slightly
altered to make them applicable to lateral piercing situations.l'8 The
first part of the Kingsman test, the alter ego plus fraud test, should be
changed to the following language: veil-piercing is allowed if the
corporation or LLC is the 'alter ego' of the shareholder or member,
or affiliated business where fraud or deceit has been practiced on a
third party by the shareholder or member, or by the affiliated
business, acting through the corporation or LLC. This change would
retain the function of traditional veil-piercing, but would also allow
the liability of one corporation or LLC to be imposed onto all types
of affiliated companies if the corporation or LLC is the alter ego of
the other business and fraud exists.
The second part of the Kingsman test, the indistinguishability test,
should be changed to the following language: veil-piercing is
allowed if the shareholder or member or affiliated business disregards
the separate identity of a corporation or LLC to such an extent that the
corporation orLLC ceases to be distinguishable from its shareholder,
185. Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (La. 1991)
(citing Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964)).
186. See supra Part IlI.A.2.
187. See supra Part III.A.2.
188. The italicized alterations would make the traditional veil-piercing doctrine
applicable to lateral piercing situations.
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member, or affiliated business. This language would retain the
function of traditional veil-piercing, but would also allow the liability
of one corporation or LLC to be imposed onto all types of affiliated
companies if the companies are indistinguishable.
The five-factor test of traditional veil-piercing could be easily
changed to the following:
(1) commingling of personal and business funds, or the funds
of two or more affiliated businesses;
(2) the observance of statutory formalities in the formation
and operation of the company(ies);
(3) undercapitalization;
(4) whether a separate bank account has been established for
the corporation or LLC, and whether each corporation's
or LLC's financial records are separately maintained;'89
and
(5) whether regular meetings of shareholders and directors
have been heldfor each corporation.
Also, the limitations on the five-factor test should be altered, so that
veil piercing would not be allowed if based solely on the fact that:
(1) the shareholder or member, or affiliated business, has a
plurality, majority, or complete ownership interest in the
corporation or LLC;
(2) the corporation or LLC was minimally capitalized; or
(3) the corporation or LLC was formed by the shareholder or
member, or affiliated business, for the very purpose of
avoiding liability.
This five-factor test should be considered "in light of the totality of
the circumstances."
An application of these tests is justified because they have been
tested and refined for decades. Traditional veil-piercing doctrine, in
some form, is commonly accepted throughout all American
jurisdictions. 9 0 Further, the Louisiana Supreme Court has endorsed
traditional veil-piercing, but has not endorsed the single business
enterprise theory.' Most important, however, the legislature has
189. Although affiliated businesses sometimes share the same bank account,
their funds should be distinguishable through accounting measures.
190. See generally Henn & Alexander, supra note 23.
191. See Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1992); Morris
& Holmes, supra note 2, § 32.02.
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implicitly accepted veil-piercing. Although it has had plenty of
opportunities, the legislature has never statutorily overruled
traditional veil-piercing, even though it disregards the legislative
grant of limited liability. This non-action by the legislature implies
that it believes its concerns about disregarding the separate identity
of a corporation or LLC are adequately considered in traditional veil-
piercing cases. The same is not true for the single business enterprise
theory. The single business enterprise theory is much younger than
traditional veil-piercing and the dangers posed by the single business
enterprise theory have manifested only within the past two years with
Hamilton and Grayson. Consequently, the legislature has had less
opportunity to see the effects of the theory and less opportunity to react
to those effects. Finally, these alterations are supported by
jurisprudence. Similar adjustments have been made in other situations
in Louisiana,'92 and by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.'93
B. Effect of Proposal
Although there may be some concerns about this proposal, any
concerns should be largely outweighed by the benefits. This proposal
would simultaneously prevent the abuse of limited liability and
adequately balance underlying policy concerns. It should be a fair
compromise for businesses, the state, and creditors.
One concern with lateral veil-piercing is that it might put the
creditors of affiliated corporations at a greater risk than if only
vertical piercing were allowed. If the veil is pierced laterally, the
assets of one company might be used to pay the creditors of a sister
corporation or LLC, potentially leaving the corporation or LLC
paying the debt without sufficient assets to pay its own creditors.
This may occur; however, the likelihood of this occurrence would be
lower if traditional veil-piercing were applied laterally than if the first
circuit's single business enterprise theory continues to be applied.
Whereas the single business enterprise theory has been applied under
an array of circumstances, traditional veil-piercing is applied only
under limited circumstances.
Any concerns, however, seem to be outweighed by the proposal's
benefits. This proposal would solve the major problems associated
with the first circuit's single business enterprise theory. First, the
proposal would alleviate policy concerns. As stated throughout this
article, traditional veil-piercing balances competing policies better
192. See Withers v. Timber Prods., Inc., 574 So. 2d 1291 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1991).
193. See Glenn v. Wagner, 329 S.E.2d 326 (N.C. 1985).
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than the first circuit's single business enterprise theory. Most
important, all veil-piercing, lateral and vertical, would consider
whether an inequity exists. Additionally, the poor legal methodology
used by the Champion court would be corrected. By applying
traditional veil-piercing to lateral piercing situations, past
jurisprudence would not be misinterpreted or misapplied. Finally, the
first circuit would no longer have two theories to confuse; there
would one correct theory.
Although the veil-piercing doctrine is not without problems, it
does not suffer from such extensive problems as the single business
enterprise theory. Veil-piercing may not be the perfect alternative,
but it is certainlythe better alternative. It more appropriately balances
the policies involved, and it does not suffer from the same problems
in legal methodology or policy as does the first circuit's single
business enterprise theory. North Carolina's Supreme Court adopted
this proposal in Glenn; Louisiana's first circuit should do the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Champion court unnecessarily established a new theory by
erroneously applying past jurisprudence. The first circuit's single
business enterprise theory allows courts to disregard the separate
identity of a corporation or LLC without proper justification. As a
result, limited liability is less dependable and, therefore, the first
circuit's single business enterprise theory discourages business
development in Louisiana. The first circuit should overrule
Champion and its progeny by allowing traditional veil-piercing
doctrine to be applied laterally. If the first circuit fails to do this, the
legislature should statutorily ban the first circuit's single business
enterprise theory.
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